Today, we must admit that the most powerful special operation aimed at inspiring a prolonged political crisis in Russia has ended in a fiasco. The beginning of this “great campaign” was the loud “poisoning” of Alexei Navalny, after which this “fighter for truth” was openly put in the context of the geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia. Then, Navalny was invited to Germany as a personal guest of Angela Merkel; “killing but not fully lethal” “Novichok” appeared; sanctions against Russia emerged; the American secret services published the tracking data of FSB officers. Everything points to the fact that the West perceives Navalny as a key factor for the destabilisation of its global enemy.
There have always been tensions between the nationalist central territories of Ukraine and pro-Russian eastern and southern parts. The coup in Ukraine in 2014 was essentially the work of frustrated, jealous, destructive, hateful national-fascists from Galicia (Ukraine). The national-fascist mentality of these people has permeated the entire society of Ukraine since then. Their acts include the weeks of atrocities during the Maidan protests and the murder of 106 peaceful people in Odessa on 2 May 2014.
Recurring disinformation narratives about the alleged widespread influence of fascism in Ukraine and casting the 2013-14 Euromaidan revolution as a coup.
The Euromaidan protests were a spontaneous reaction among large parts of the Ukrainian population, ignited by the decision of former President Yanukovych not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013. Independent investigations found that policemen were responsible for firing at the protesters, starting heavy clashes, for instance, on 20 February 2014, which left 48 protesters and four police officers dead.
The myth of Nazi-ruled Ukraine has been the cornerstone of Russian disinformation about the country since the very beginning of the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests, when it was used to discredit the pro-European popular uprising in Kyiv and, subsequently, the broader pro-Western shift in Ukraine's foreign policy.
Far-right groups enjoyed a very limited presence during the Euromaidan itself and had poor results in the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections. In the 2019 election, far-right candidates fell short of the 5% minimum guaranteeing entry into parliament.