Ukrainian Euromaidan was not spontaneous. It was prepared secretly from Ukrainian society from outside Ukraine. This allows considering Euromaidan an orange revolution. The aims of Euromaidan organizers were to change the geopolitical map of Europe, namely, to destroy the Eurasian Union, to tear Ukraine apart from Russia, and to weaken Russia. The latter headed the resistance to Western neo-liberal order. In this political game, Ukraine became a bargaining chip without any independent value. The revolution organizers reckoned that without Russian ties Ukraine will be ultimately destroyed by inner contradictions. Only a few people in the West were interested in the fate of Ukraine. They wanted Ukraine to make its case and to die. Today’s Ukraine existence is fully dependent on the successful implementation of its only function, namely, to destabilize Russia. Euromaidan’s victory meant that Ukrainian statehood entered into the phase of agony. This agony will continue until Ukraine will preserve any chance to conduct aggressive, anti-Russian politics.
The Polish political elite and West-owned media concerns carry out a large-scale campaign promoting the anti-Russian attitudes in Poland. Key goal of this campaign is to persuade the Poles that they need expensive Western weapons and natural resources (which are cheaper in Russia). The Polish public opinion is made to support these expensive projects through a threat, real or alleged.
This message is a pro-Kremlin narrative on the “elites vs. people” – in this case, the political “elites” of Central and Eastern European countries are fully controlled by the West/USA, manipulating their societies in order to make them anti-Russian. See other examples of this message here, here and here. The statement that the political elites of Poland and the Western controlled media groups carry out a coordinated policy of spread of the anti-Russian attitudes in Poland is a conspiracy theory. The position of the main Polish political parties on purchasing Western weapons and the deployment of NATO troops in Poland reflects the Polish public opinion on these issues. For example, 65% of the Poles support the deployment of troops from other NATO countries in Poland, and 81% - fully support the Polish membership in NATO (CBOS NATO poll, March 2019). This poll had shown a substantial increase in public support for the Polish membership in NATO (+19%) immediately after the Russian annexation of Crimea. This fact indicates that the Polish perception of NATO and Russia comes not from alleged “elite” manipulations, but from assessment of aggressive Russian actions in Ukraine by the Polish citizens.