Moscow has blocked the Security Council’s decision against the Syrian government more than ten times. That is why the UN countries want to use the resolution of “Unity for Peace” dated November 3, 1950, which, in the case of the approval of 9 out of 15 members of the UN Security Council, bypass Russian veto and passes the question to the General Assembly. However, this resolution is not in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to paragraph 3 of Article 27, decisions on all issues, except for procedural matters, are deemed to be adopted if the “corresponding number of permanent members of the Council” votes for them.
No evidence given. The 1950 “uniting for peace” route was explicitly designed to be used when the security council could not meet its responsibilities over maintenance of peace. ask.un.org/faq/177134
For background: legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html
On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title “Uniting for Peace”. The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea. At the initial stage of this armed conflict, in June 1950, the Security Council had been able to recommend to the Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950). The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence the Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of nine members “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The majority of the members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22).
Although the shifting of responsibilities to the General Assembly may not be consistent with the original intentions of the drafters of the Charter, it is today fully accepted that emergency special sessions have become an integral part of the legal order of the United Nations.