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Comment nous collectons les informations
La sélection des travaux veille à préserver un juste équilibre entre profondeur académique et fiabilité, mais aussi à représenter des points de vue et des centres d’intérêt très variés allant au-delà de la sphère universitaire. Nous avons établi des mesures de contrôle de la qualité. La sélection des informations repose sur les cinq domaines ci-dessous.
Ce domaine est consacré aux activités des principaux acteurs de la menace, à savoir la Russie et la Chine, ainsi qu’à leurs objectifs, motivations et capacités.
Ce domaine examine les méthodes et les outils utilisés par les acteurs de la menace pour manipuler l’information: médias sociaux, discours, nouvelles technologies, etc.
Ce domaine se concentre sur les champs sociopolitiques ciblés par les acteurs de la menace: cohésion sociale, processus politiques, santé, sécurité et politique étrangère.
Ce domaine thématique se concentre sur les effets des activités de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence menées depuis l'étranger (FIMI) en termes de résultats: impacts cognitifs, division sociale et politique, projection de pouvoir d’influence, etc.
Ce domaine classe les types de réponses aux activités de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence menées depuis l'étranger (FIMI) en fonction de différents domaines: réponses réglementaires, proactives et autorégulatrices, réactives et recommandations politiques.
Filtres
A paper examining how the United States, China, and Russia are incorporating AI in their information warfare strategies and tactics and the implications of this trend for international security.
A study of the implications of AI-powered information warfare in the Indo-Pacific for regional and global security, inclluding recommendations on near term responses.
An analysis of hybrid cyber threats within the Lithuanian context, focusing on the examination of national strategies to mitigate them and identifying potential areas for improvement.
A study investigating the extent to which victimisation narratives in state information campaigns are effective in influencing external audiences, with a focus on Russia and China.
A short, pesssimistic review of the implications of conversational AI (eg, ’empathy bots’) on information warfare.
An analysis of the lessons about information warfare that the Chinese government is likely to draw from Russia war in Ukraine as viewed through the lens of US proxy conflicts.
A study of measures to combat Russian informationa operations targeting Ukraine and the Czech Republic covering three levels: government, media, civil society.
A report on the implications of generative AI for information warfare, arguing that the technology poses a potential national security threat in terms of the risk of misuse by Russia, China and other adversaries in social media manipulation.
An article on China’s use of information warfare to destabilise foreign regimes in the midst of a potential military or political crisis with democratic governments (drawing lessons from Japan’s experience during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05).
A study adapting ‘morphological’ theory to conceptualise social media disinformation threatening democratic processes along five parameters: spread strategy, information channelling, market targeting, presented source, and operational openness.
A report exploring the comparative success of Russia’s and Ukraine’s information campaigins arguing that the popular discourse professing that Russia has lost the information war is oversimplified.
A study of measures to combat disinformation, including resilience, regulations, public diplomacy, strategic signalling and counter messaging.
A review of ways that the United States could improve its capacity in information warfare against China, with policy recommendations.
A study of cognitive warfare and psychological strategies seeking to gradually influence the targeted public’s beliefs, opinions and perceptions with an empirical focus on the China-Taiwan relationship.
A study of asymmetrical information tactics through the lens of Complex Adaptive Systems that seeks to demonstrate how, by controlling the information flow during the Russian annexation of Crimea, Moscow applied complexity to the adversary on the one hand and stabilised the Crimean social system on the other.