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Comment nous collectons les informations
La sélection des travaux veille à préserver un juste équilibre entre profondeur académique et fiabilité, mais aussi à représenter des points de vue et des centres d’intérêt très variés allant au-delà de la sphère universitaire. Nous avons établi des mesures de contrôle de la qualité. La sélection des informations repose sur les cinq domaines ci-dessous.
Ce domaine est consacré aux activités des principaux acteurs de la menace, à savoir la Russie et la Chine, ainsi qu’à leurs objectifs, motivations et capacités.
Ce domaine examine les méthodes et les outils utilisés par les acteurs de la menace pour manipuler l’information: médias sociaux, discours, nouvelles technologies, etc.
Ce domaine se concentre sur les champs sociopolitiques ciblés par les acteurs de la menace: cohésion sociale, processus politiques, santé, sécurité et politique étrangère.
Ce domaine thématique se concentre sur les effets des activités de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence menées depuis l'étranger (FIMI) en termes de résultats: impacts cognitifs, division sociale et politique, projection de pouvoir d’influence, etc.
Ce domaine classe les types de réponses aux activités de manipulation de l'information et d'ingérence menées depuis l'étranger (FIMI) en fonction de différents domaines: réponses réglementaires, proactives et autorégulatrices, réactives et recommandations politiques.
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An analysis of the construction of fake news as a security threat, which has created a moral panic that may lead to the restriction of freedom of expression and information within democratic societies.
A report on the use by American right-wing extremists of a “multi-platform” strategy to spread their ideological messages, including some discussion of regulatory and other responses.
A qualitative analysis of the French extreme right’s social media strategy during the 2014 and 2019 European elections.
This paper analyses information warfare in the Russo-Ukraine war, contrasting it with prior operations to illustrate the evolution, limitations, and possible future of information warfare during a kinetic conflict.
A study of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) coordinated cognitive warfare operations during the COVID pandemic in Taiwan.
An analysis of how disinformation circulates on social media as adversarial narratives embedded in identity-driven controversies, with a case study on the “Flat Earth” echo chamber on YouTube.
A paper exploring whether Ukraine residents can distinguish between pro-Kremlin disinformation and true statements; and which pro-Kremlin disinformation claims are more believable.
A study of Russia’s information campaigns via Facebook targeting the 2016 US presidential election, with interesting findings about which techniques are more effective than others.
A report on divisive information campaigns within the climate change context, with abundant discussion of regulatory and other measures to combat them.
An investigation of susceptibility to pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective drawing on evidence from Ukraine.
A paper conceptualizing disinformation as a context-bound deliberate act for which actors covertly deceive recipients by de-contextualizing, manipulating, or fabricating information.
An analysis of Russian attempts to use junk news targeting US right wing extremists, with a focus on uncovering the propagandists’ goals and motivations.
A study of privacy harm tactics in information warfare and how to handle incident reponses.
A study of alarmist narratives about online misinformation arguing that its prevalence and impact are overstated and identifying six misconceptions.
A study of Russia’s use of misinformation and deception to generate doubt and uncertainty about the country’s true intentions (with an emphasis on nuclear postures).