In this section you will find a reading list encompassing a wide range of studies, articles and reports relating to the spread of pro-Kremlin disinformation.
Whether you want a general introduction, to learn about the Kremlin’s attempts to influence elections, or investigate how one single false message gets spread via a wide network of websites – this is the place to start.
How we collect the material
The selection of works keeps a balance between academic depth and reputability, but also a breadth of perspectives and interests beyond the academy. We have established quality control measures and the material selection was based on the five issue areas below.
This area is dedicated to the activities of major threat actors, namely Russia and China and their aims, motives and capacities.
This area captures the methods and tools deployed by threat actors to manipulate information: social media, narratives, emerging tech etc.
This area focuses on the socio-political areas targeted by threat actors: social cohesion, political processes, health, security and foreign policy.
This issue area centres on the effects of FIMI (foreign information manipulations and interference) in terms of outcomes: cognitive impacts, social and political division, soft power projection etc.
This area classifies the types of responses to FIMI (foreign information manipulations and interference) by a range of stakeholders: regulatory, proactive and self-regulatory, reactive responses and policy recommendations.
An analysis of the construction of fake news as a security threat, which has created a moral panic that may lead to the restriction of freedom of expression and information within democratic societies.
A report on the use by American right-wing extremists of a “multi-platform” strategy to spread their ideological messages, including some discussion of regulatory and other responses.
A qualitative analysis of the French extreme right’s social media strategy during the 2014 and 2019 European elections.
This paper analyses information warfare in the Russo-Ukraine war, contrasting it with prior operations to illustrate the evolution, limitations, and possible future of information warfare during a kinetic conflict.
A study of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) coordinated cognitive warfare operations during the COVID pandemic in Taiwan.
An analysis of how disinformation circulates on social media as adversarial narratives embedded in identity-driven controversies, with a case study on the “Flat Earth” echo chamber on YouTube.
A paper exploring whether Ukraine residents can distinguish between pro-Kremlin disinformation and true statements; and which pro-Kremlin disinformation claims are more believable.
A study of Russia’s information campaigns via Facebook targeting the 2016 US presidential election, with interesting findings about which techniques are more effective than others.
A report on divisive information campaigns within the climate change context, with abundant discussion of regulatory and other measures to combat them.
An investigation of susceptibility to pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective drawing on evidence from Ukraine.
A paper conceptualizing disinformation as a context-bound deliberate act for which actors covertly deceive recipients by de-contextualizing, manipulating, or fabricating information.
An analysis of Russian attempts to use junk news targeting US right wing extremists, with a focus on uncovering the propagandists’ goals and motivations.
A study of privacy harm tactics in information warfare and how to handle incident reponses.
A study of alarmist narratives about online misinformation arguing that its prevalence and impact are overstated and identifying six misconceptions.
A study of Russia’s use of misinformation and deception to generate doubt and uncertainty about the country’s true intentions (with an emphasis on nuclear postures).