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Cómo recopilamos el material
En la selección de trabajos primamos el equilibrio entre profundidad académica y reputación, sin por ello dejar de cubrir un amplio abanico de perspectivas e intereses más allá del ámbito académico. Tenemos en marcha medidas de control de calidad y la selección del material se estructura en las cinco áreas indicadas a continuación.
Esta área está dedicada a las actividades de los principales agentes ―es decir, Rusia y China―, así como a sus objetivos, razones y capacidades.
Esta área comprende los métodos e instrumentos que emplean los agentes de amenazas para manipular información: redes sociales, narrativas, tecnología emergente, etc.
Esta área se centra en los ámbitos sociopolíticos en los que se insertan las amenazas: cohesión social, procesos políticos, salud, seguridad y política exterior.
Esta área aborda los efectos de la manipulación de información y la injerencia por parte de agentes extranjeros en términos de resultados: efectos cognitivos, división social y política, proyección del «poder blando», etc.
Esta área clasifica los tipos de respuestas a la manipulación de información y la injerencia por parte de agentes extranjeros según las partes interesadas: reguladoras, proactivas y autorreguladoras, respuestas reactivas y recomendaciones políticas.
Filtros
An analysis of the construction of fake news as a security threat, which has created a moral panic that may lead to the restriction of freedom of expression and information within democratic societies.
A report on the use by American right-wing extremists of a “multi-platform” strategy to spread their ideological messages, including some discussion of regulatory and other responses.
A qualitative analysis of the French extreme right’s social media strategy during the 2014 and 2019 European elections.
This paper analyses information warfare in the Russo-Ukraine war, contrasting it with prior operations to illustrate the evolution, limitations, and possible future of information warfare during a kinetic conflict.
A study of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) coordinated cognitive warfare operations during the COVID pandemic in Taiwan.
An analysis of how disinformation circulates on social media as adversarial narratives embedded in identity-driven controversies, with a case study on the “Flat Earth” echo chamber on YouTube.
A paper exploring whether Ukraine residents can distinguish between pro-Kremlin disinformation and true statements; and which pro-Kremlin disinformation claims are more believable.
A study of Russia’s information campaigns via Facebook targeting the 2016 US presidential election, with interesting findings about which techniques are more effective than others.
A report on divisive information campaigns within the climate change context, with abundant discussion of regulatory and other measures to combat them.
An investigation of susceptibility to pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective drawing on evidence from Ukraine.
A paper conceptualizing disinformation as a context-bound deliberate act for which actors covertly deceive recipients by de-contextualizing, manipulating, or fabricating information.
An analysis of Russian attempts to use junk news targeting US right wing extremists, with a focus on uncovering the propagandists’ goals and motivations.
A study of privacy harm tactics in information warfare and how to handle incident reponses.
A study of alarmist narratives about online misinformation arguing that its prevalence and impact are overstated and identifying six misconceptions.
A study of Russia’s use of misinformation and deception to generate doubt and uncertainty about the country’s true intentions (with an emphasis on nuclear postures).