In this section you will find a reading list encompassing a wide range of studies, articles and reports relating to the spread of pro-Kremlin disinformation.

Whether you want a general introduction, to learn about the Kremlin’s attempts to influence elections, or investigate how one single false message gets spread via a wide network of websites – this is the place to start.

How we collect the material

The selection of works keeps a balance between academic depth and reputability, but also a breadth of perspectives and interests beyond the academy. We have established quality control measures and the material selection was based on the five issue areas below.

Issue area 1
Threat actors

This area is dedicated to the activities of major threat actors, namely Russia and China and their aims, motives and capacities.

Issue area 2
Methods & Tools

This area captures the methods and tools deployed by threat actors to manipulate information: social media, narratives, emerging tech etc.

Issue area 3
Interference Areas

This area focuses on the socio-political areas targeted by threat actors: social cohesion, political processes, health, security and foreign policy.

Issue area 4

This issue area centres on the effects of FIMI (foreign information manipulations and interference) in terms of outcomes: cognitive impacts, social and political division, soft power projection etc.

Issue area 5

This area classifies the types of responses to FIMI (foreign information manipulations and interference) by a range of stakeholders: regulatory, proactive and self-regulatory, reactive responses and policy recommendations.


Threat Actors:
Methods & Tools:
Interference Areas:
149 results
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2022 | ISD Global | Report
Effectiveness of the Sanctions on Russian State-Affiliated Media in the EU – An investigation into website traffic & possible circumvention methods
By: Kata Balint, Jordan Wildon, Francesca Arcostanzo, Kevin D. Reyes
View summary

A report assessing the effectiveness of EU restrictions on Russian state-affiliated media after invasion of Ukraine and circumvention methods against them.

2022 | ISD Global | Report
Telegram as a Buttress: How far-right extremists and conspiracy theorists are expanding their infrastructures via Telegram
By: Lea Gerster, Richard Kuchta, Dominik Hammer, Christian Schwieter
View summary

A report on German speaking extreme right-wing groups’ use of Telegram to circumvent platform regulations.

2022 | PNAS | Article
How Digital Media Drive Affective Polarization through Partisan Sorting
By: Petter Törnberg
View summary

A study of how social media generates sentiments affecting perceptions among political partisan groups.

2022 | Public Integrity | Article
Russian Disinformation in the Baltics: Does it Really Work?
By: Mangirdas Morkūnas
View summary

A study of the effetcts of Russian information campaigns on the minds of citizens in the Baltic States (with a focus on Lithuania).

2022 | National Taipei University; Doublethink Lab (Taiwan) | Article
Relating Credibility to Writing Style, Emotion, and Scope of Spread of Disinformation
By: Puma Shen, Yun Ju Chen, Poyu Tseng
View summary

A study of factors contributing to the credibility of disinformation in Taiwan, with a review of regulations and other approaches to combat it.

2022 | RAND Corporation | Article
Artificial Intelligence, Deepfakes, and Disinformation: A Primer
By: Todd C. Helmus
View summary

A report on emerging technological threat trends in AI and deepfakes, with some useful discussion of efforts to combat them.

2022 | Defense & Security Analysis | Article
Information Warfare: Methods to Counter Disinformation
By: Andrew Dowse, Sascha Dov Bachmann
View summary

A study of different kinds of misinformation approaches to combatting it: passive, reactive, pre-active, pro-active.

2022 | ISD Global | Report
Information Warfare and Wikipedia
By: Carl Miller, Melanie Smith, Oliver Marsh, Kata Balint, Chris Inskip, Francesca Visser
View summary

A report on Wikipedia’s vulnerabilities to systemic manipulation observed on social media.

2022 | ISD Global | Report
Le spectre de la fraude électorale : l’impact des discours de désinformation pendant les élections de 2022
By: Cécile Simmons, Sasha Morinière, Roman Adamczyk
View summary

A report on the propagation of polarising information regarding the 2022 elections in France.

2022 | New Media and Society | Article
Inside a White Power Echo Chamber: Why Fringe Digital Spaces Are Polarizing Politics
By: Petter Törnberg, Anton Törnberg
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A study proposing a theory of discursive community formation within digital media, with a focus on social psychology and linguistic factors.

2022 | Global Engagement Center (US Department of State) | Website
Disarming Disinformation: Our Shared Responsibility
By: NA
View summary

This website collects vaulable reports but does not offer detailed analysis of its own.

2022 | Global Engagement Center (US Department of State) | Report
Kremlin-Funded Media: RT and Sputnik’s Role in Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem
By: NA
View summary

A comprehensive and well-written report from a trustworthy source.

2022 | ISD Global | Report
L’interdiction de RT et Sputnik : impacts et implications pour l’écosystème en ligne français
By: Sasha Moriniere, Zoé Fourel
View summary

A study of the EU’s restrictions on RT and Sputnik and related French social media activity.

2022 | ISD Global | Report
Banning RT and Sputnik Across Europe: What Does it Hold for the Future of Platform Regulation?
By: Sara Bundtzen, Mauritius Dorn
View summary

A study of the implications of the EU’s restrictions on RT and Sputnik and their attempts to circumvent the measures.

2022 | ISD Global | Report
The Vladimirror Network: Pro-Putin Power-Users on Facebook
By: Moustafa Ayad
View summary

A detailed report on a pro-Putin social media campaign (detailing tactics and methods) on Facebook amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

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Cases in the EUvsDisinfo database focus on messages in the international information space that are identified as providing a partial, distorted, or false depiction of reality and spread key pro-Kremlin messages. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a given outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially pro-Kremlin, or that it has intentionally sought to disinform. EUvsDisinfo publications do not represent an official EU position, as the information and opinions expressed are based on media reporting and analysis of the East Stratcom Task Force.

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